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Abstract: When designing and analysing autonomous systems and their
environment it is necessary to consider uncertainty and multiple potential states
(of the system and its environment). In this position paper, we explore the idea
of notations and modelling tools that are based on ‘superpositions’ of states. More
concretely, we present a treatment of uncertainty in autonomous systems inspired
by quantum physics and propose an extension of the Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN), a common approach for the modelling of safety arguments, to model
’superposition’ and ’entangled’ nodes; and, incorporate guidelines of the emerging
UL 4600 standard for autonomous systems.
Keywords: autonomous vehicles; uncertainty; safety assurance cases; GSN, UL
4600
1 Introduction
I am sitting with a philosopher in the
garden; he says again and again ‘I know
that that’s a tree’, pointing to a tree that is
near us. Someone else arrives and hears
this, and I tell him: ‘This fellow isn’t
insane. We are only doing philosophy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty
In safety-critical systems, it is critical to give grounds for why the software can be trusted.
Current trends on autonomous vehicles (AVs) heighten the challenge of assuring they are safe,
especially in view that AVs need to operate in unpredictable situations and to make real-time
decisions which so far have been the remit of human drivers. Part of the challenge stands with the
fact that developing autonomous systems, entails designing for uncertainty [RJC12, FC19] which
in turn exacerbates the need for uncertainty-aware software development methodologies [FC19].
One technique used by classic (not fully autonomous) safety-critical domains is the submission
of a safety assurance case that provides a documented trail, which demonstrates that state of the
art safety considerations have been followed and are traceable throughout the system. This, in
essence, entails showing that the potential risks associated with using the safety-critical system
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in its intended domain have been identified and acceptably mitigated. It provides the grounds to
convince the certification bodies (e.g. [RTC11, ISO11, FA+10, ISO19]) and other stakeholders
that the system is acceptably safe [Lev11, HHKM13, DP18].
Using safety assurance cases in AVs is still a new and brave frontier. That said, existing
research of particular interest for the focus of this paper is the emerging standard1 for autonomous
systems [Und19] and research on treatments of uncertainty [FC19].
In this position paper, we take a multidisciplinary lens to the treatment of uncertainty. We draw
ideas from quantum physics where uncertainty has been treated as a domain-native for decades
to posit our ideas on modelling uncertainty for autonomous systems. We also build on previous
work by [DP18] and [Und19] and propose an extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)2.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we discuss safety assurance
cases and the latest developments in this area. In Section 3 we discuss the concept of uncertainty
from a multidisciplinary point of view and present our position in the treatment of uncertainty
and its implications for autonomous vehicles (including a running example in Section 3.1). In
Section 4 we propose our ideas extending GSN to capture autonomous assurance cases and
finally we draw conclusions in Section 5.
2 Assurance Cases
Assurance cases are a technique used to argue that a system is safe for a given application
in a defined environment. Formally, the assurance case is a “Reasoned, auditable artifact
created for contention that its top-level claim (or a set of claims), is satisfied, including
systematic argumentation and its underlying evidence and explicit assumption(s) that support
the claim.” [ISO19].
Simply put, assurance cases are structured arguments backed by evidence on why a specific
safety goal or claim is met. The typical anatomy of a safety case consists of (1) the safety goal
(typically split into sub-goals) that needs be achieved; (2) the backing evidence for achieving this
goal; and, (3) the structured argument, which establishes the systematic relationship between the
evidence and the goals.
Both the arguments and the evidence can be somewhat informal. As such, the arguments can
express some degree of confidence, while the backing evidence can take multiple forms such as
results from model checking, testing, analysis, modeling, simulation; or, expert opinions. An
in-depth analysis of assurance cases and exiting tool support for them can be found in [DP18].
While there is no particular notation required, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [SCS18],
is adopted widely. Figure 1 provides an illustration of a safety argument in GSN notation
constructed for the Duckietown environment3.
The nodes in GSN provide a simple description for the goals, strategies, assumptions,
1 The Standard for Safety for the Evaluation of Autonomous Products, UL 4600 is being developed as a UL
– Underwriters Laboratories standard by a Standards Technical Panel (STP) composed from researchers and
practitioners from industry and academia. It is projected to be ratified as a UL standard in the first half of 2020.
2 A graphical notation which is adopted widely to capture safety assurance cases
3 This simplified diagram is extracted from our work-in-progress research in safety arguments for autonomous
vehicles where the Duckietown environment (from an MIT classroom started activity: www.duckietown.org) is used
as a running example.
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Figure 1: A partial safety argument in GSN notation
justifications and evidence and are meant as pointers to fully detailed artifacts. The aim is
to trace all of the safety goals to credible evidence without gaps in coverage and where all
assumptions are analysed vis-à-vis their validity. Not surprisingly, assurance cases are especially
useful in situations where the system is too complex to be ‘proven’ safe using formal verification
approaches or more broadly when heavy-weight formal approaches are not feasible to be used.
A promising development for the world of assurance cases is UL 4600 [Und19] which aims
to support a structured way to argue that autonomous vehicles are safe. Its first version focuses
in highly automated vehicles and looks at the challenges of AV safety in the absence of human
drivers and presence of non-determinism. It looks at all the different functionality provided by
human drivers including fault recovery and expected misuse.
The goal of UL 4600 is to provide guidance on adopting the required system-level engineering
rigour and is meant to be used alongside the other standards that regulate the domain (e.g., ISO
26262) [ISO11]. That said, in contrast to, say, ISO26262, instead of prescribing ‘how to do
safety’, UL 4600 is goal-based and makes use of assurance cases to argue in a structured way
that the system is acceptably safe [PK19]. Typically the safety goal defines what acceptably safe
means for the case in question and then it proceeds to argue how the AV meets that definition.
It does not prescribe any specific software engineering approaches but it requires the use of
rigorous ones. For example, it does not prescribe how to do testing and verification, but it
rather requires a sound argumentation that you have done sufficient testing and verification. Its
creators see it as a framework for systematically putting together all of the elements needed to
create an acceptably safe AV. It facilitates this task by providing reference lists, lists of safety
case topics, prompts and epistemic defeaters (‘Did you consider what happens in cases of black
ice?’), reference lists of hazards and lists of techniques that can be used to identify hazards, good
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practices to follow and bad practices to avoid [PK19].
All the prompts provided by UL 4600 need to be considered but not necessarily adopted, and
for guidance they are classified into:
• Mandatory – prompts that are required to be considered.
• Highly Recommended – prompts that can be ignored or altered with non-trivial rationale.
• Examples – prompts that are meant as illustrative reminders and not required do be
addressed exhaustively.
• Recommended –prompts that are entirely optional.
3 Reasoning with Uncertainty
Uncertainty has been studied in many disciplines and a significant amount of research has
focused on analysing and interpreting it [Hei27, MS58, Laf, TK74, GPS08, TK94, CW04,
Kni12].
In economics, typically uncertainty is treated as a stochastic or probabilistic situation [Laf],
where the frequency or outcome of an event is not known [GPS08] including situations where it is
not possible to specify definite numerical probabilities for a specific (desired) outcome [Kni12].
Treatments of uncertainty in economical studies often intersect with uncertainty in decision
making and project management (e.g., [Jaa01, PGW08]).
In psychology, uncertainty is typically discussed against the backdrop of certainty and is
conceptualized as a psychological state. Wittgenstein posited that being ‘certain’ is not any
‘knowing’ but it rather is a matter of us feeling that ’we cannot imagine otherwise’4 [WAV86].
This somewhat non-deterministic treatment of uncertainty resonates with quantum physics
where what is commonly referred to as the ’uncertainty principle’ is one of the key concepts that
brought forward a revolution on our understanding of the universe.
Uncertainty in quantum physics can be considered ’native’, and yet its meaning is
subject to different schools of thought and interpretations. Different conceptualisations of
uncertainty include ontological interpretations (lack of knowledge by an observer) and, epistemic
interpretations (e.g., measurement inaccuracy). In fact, even the terminology comprises a range
of words such as indeterminacy, indefiniteness and, inaccuracy.
At the heart of both the thought revolution; and, lack of consensus and generational debates
brought forward by quantum theories is the issue of how (and whether) the measurement process
affects the ontological state of an observed system (and in some interpretations the observer
her/himself) and it has even entered common parlance as ‘the measurement problem’.
For us, in dealing with uncertainty in autonomous systems, this struggle is mirrored in the
somewhat ‘simpler’ struggle of developing a measure of uncertainty that we know how do deal
4 Please note how Wittgenstein’s thinking connects to Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) and to the quantum physicist
Hugh Everett III (1930–1982) who gave us the multiverse quantum hypothesis (referred to as ‘the branching world’
below):
“Bryce DeWitt, an American physicist who had edited the journal where Everett’s thesis appeared, wrote a letter to
him complaining that the real world obviously didn’t ‘branch’, since we never experience such things. Everett replied
with a reference to Copernicus’s similarly daring idea that the Earth moves around the Sun, rather than vice-versa: ‘I
can’t resist asking: do you feel the motion of the Earth?’ DeWitt had to admit that was a pretty good response.” –
Sean Carroll, Something Deeply Hidden
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with operationally. Borrowing from the quantum physics’ thought experiments we can posit that
we can profitably reason about the behaviour of autonomous vehicles if we know a probability
distribution of the likelihood that the AV might be behaving in various ways.
Entanglement (in quantum physics), at its simplest, suggests that when two particles interact
or share spatial proximity, their behaviour becomes intrinsically linked even after they are far
apart. Say two electrons were moving with equal opposite velocities and they bump onto each
other. Even though before their encounter they each had probabilities of travelling in certain
paths which were completely unrelated to each other, after their encounter they will move in
precisely opposite directions. We say that the electrons are entangled5.
Now let us draw our attention to the ’macro’ world of AVs and conceptualise them as entities
that have different probability distributions of the likelihood of behaving in various ways.
We use the entangled uncertainties metaphor to posit that we should design for uncertainty
by conceptualizing our design choices as superimposed ontological representations of reality.
Our overall design for uncertainty resembles a ‘solutions superposition-model’ 6. Where, each
solution taken (in other words the AV’s behaviour at a specific time-step matches that particular
solution), entangles the uncertainty in the AV behaviour within at least the next time step (the
length of the time step would depend on when the next interaction of the AV will cause the
uncertainties of its behaviour to become entangled with the environment (e.g., bumps into the
next thing). Hence the intuition is that if we have enough ’certain’ solutions designed in our
’solutions superposition-model’ we can draw upon the ’entanglement of uncertainties’ argument
and collapse the problem-space into certain outcomes for the AV behaviour. In more lay terms,
this translates into arguing about narrowing down the all possible behaviours’ state-space into a
subset of (designed for) acceptably safe behaviour by an AV.
While we characterise possible AV behaviours as probability distributions, another point
of frustration we need to clarify is the meaning we give to probability. One school of
thought sees the concept of probability connected to the frequency of an event or outcome
happening/occurring. That is perfectly satisfying for cases when we can wait to witness the
same exact event reoccurring over and over for a large number of repetitions. How often do we
get tails if a coin is tossed? But, how do we reason for cases when we are in reality dealing with
epistemic probability, where what we already know is important to help us gauge the outcome.
Even more so in cases when waiting for a very large number of occurrences or experiments
upon some events is not plausible. For example, what is the probability of the soccer team of
ones’ own country will win the world championship? In these cases, we can reason in terms of
attaching beliefs between zero and one hundred percent to the various possible outcomes where
the total set of beliefs for the possible outcomes adds up to 100 percent7.
Next, let us consider some illustrative examples of uncertainties in an autonomous
environment.
5 In the Everettian view of quantum physics the entanglement (e.g., how do the two entangled electrons ‘know’ what
the other is doing) is described via the universal wavefunction, in other words, positing that the quantum state of the
whole universe in ’interlinked’ and can be ’captured’ in one wave function.
6 Here the superposition-model plays on the quantum concept of superposition
7 In this regard, there are existing mathematical frameworks such as for example Dempster-Shafer Theory which
acknowledge the need for explicitly expressing and quantifying beliefs/confidence/lack of confidence into a certain
outcome.
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3.1 No Duck Left Behind – Uncertainty in Duckietown
Duckietown [PTA+17] is an environment that started at MIT and is aimed at education and
research in autonomous vehicles. Duckieworld is comprised of AVs (“Duckiebots”) that
autonomously drive their users (“Duckies”) around their town (“Duckietown”) that has roads,
traffic lights, and obstacles. The Duckiebots can follow lanes while abiding traffic lights and
avoiding random obstacles and the Duckie pedestrians. Their only sensor is a monocular camera
and all their on-board processing is done in a Raspberry Pi.
One of the interesting aspects of the Duckiebots for us is that they face a number of software
and environment uncertainties (Figure 1), that include:
• Prior beliefs on illumination conditions of the roads.
• Prior beliefs on road-markings colours (the Duckiebots navigation depends on
colour-coded markings).
• Errors in the estimation of fit quality that allows the system to detect road-marking
detection failure.
• False positives in road-markings’ detection.
• Errors in lane-relative estimation.
In the following section, we use these uncertainties as our running example to illustrate our
position in designing for uncertainty.
4 GSN Entangled – Designing for Uncertainty
We propose to extend GSN nodes with metadata (building on research by [DP18]) to: a)
accommodate our vision of ‘solutions superposition-model’ to model autonomous systems; and,
b) incorporate the extensive reference lists, different types of prompts and epistemic defeaters
provided by the emerging UL 4600 standard as natural elements of our treatment of uncertainty
(’entangled uncertainties’).
Specifically, to account for superposition-model nodes and our treatment of ‘entangled
uncertainties’ we propose to extend the GSN node types with:
• nodeType ::= classic | superposition | entangled
Note that when the node type is classic the node will look exactly as any other classic GSN
node. To account for respectively the need to express beliefs in certain outcomes and UL 4600’s
prompt classifications, we extend the parameter types of GSN nodes with:
• belief ::= percentageInDecimalNumber
• promptType ::= mandatory | highyRecommended | example | recommended |
As discussed in the previous sections, these ideas hail from our treatment of uncertainty
and more specifically from our thought experiments on ‘entangled uncertainties’. In Figure 2
we illustrate these ideas via a partial assurance case that captures some of the software and
environment uncertainties faced by the Duckiebots (our running example of an autonomous
environment). In here, the overall safety goal that ’Duckiebots will not hit any types of Duckies’,
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Figure 2: Partial Assurance Case Illustrating Uncertainties in Extended GSN Notation
under the assumptions that Duckies’ cameras are working correctly and they have to operate
within acceptable lighting conditions8 is split into two sub-goals: 1) ’Duckiebots will stop or
avoid collision with detected Duckies’; and, 2) ’Identify and mitigate risks caused by difficult to
detect Duckies’. The later goal is modelled via a nodeType: superposition and both sub-goals
have the parameter promptType: mandatory in their metadata. The promptType: mandatory
parameter incorporates UL 4600 in GSN notation, while nodeType: superposition reflects our
ideas on ‘entangled uncertainties’.
We incorporate the concept of ‘entangled’ probability distributions by modelling the two
‘entangled’ nodes (’All mitigations are identified and are sufficient’ and, ’Fault response and
violation strategy include feedback to accident log’) that come out of the superposition node
(’Identify and mitigate risks caused by difficult to detect Duckies’) by using the parameter type
belief : percentageInDecimalNumber. This (extended) GSN node’ metadata is expressed via a
(real) decimal number (or probability), where all the entangled nodes’ beliefs that come out of a
superposition type node add up to 1 (100%).
This is particularly important since we believe that as the technology behind quantum
computing progresses further we expect to benefit from the real power of notations and modelling
tools that ‘think’ in terms of superpositions |ψ〉 of the two classical states |0〉 and |1〉 coded in
quantum memory (for example in the same qubit):
8 Naturally this would translate into accepted weather conditions’ in real-world scenarios.
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; where, |α|2 + |β |2 = 1.
In here, the coefficients α and β are complex numbers9 and tie in nicely with our ‘entangled
nodes’ with assigned probability beliefs, since in quantum theories |α|2 and |β |2 represent
exactly the probability of a state being observed.
Finally, Figure 2 illustrates examples of evidence (’Results of analysis of coverage of different
types of Duckies’, and ’Results of detect-and-avoid simulation testing’) that are used to back up
the assurance case’s claims.
5 Conclusions
The current drive for autonomous systems will benefit from rigorous uncertainty-aware software
engineering methodologies. We believe that software engineering could profitably build upon
treatments of uncertainty from other disciplines that, in different capacities, have dealt for
decades with uncertain environments, measurements, projections, occurrences, etc.
The current safety assurance demands on autonomous systems could benefit from a paradigm
shift towards ‘complex-state’ modelling. This, in conjunction with the gained momentum in
quantum computing, could be fostered by notations and modelling tools that ‘think’ in terms of
superpositions and make use of quantum memory (as in nodes conceptualised as quantum states





; where, |α|2 + |β |2 = 1. and, |0〉& |1〉 represent of the two classical
states.)
In this paper, we explore a conceptualisation of uncertainty in autonomous systems inspired by
quantum physics which sees uncertainty as a native feature of a system. Furthermore, we propose
an extension of GSN (building on research by [DP18]) to: a) accommodate ‘superposition’ and
‘entangled’ nodes; and, b) incorporate the extensive reference lists, different types of prompts
and epistemic defeaters provided by the emerging UL 4600 standard as natural elements of
our treatment of uncertainty (‘entangled uncertainties’). In future work, we plan to focus
on modelling and validating live feedback that drives the update of beliefs in probability
distributions.
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